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THE EURO CRISIS:  







The euro faces an existential crisis. While shortly after the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers, which led to an unprecedented disruption in the 
functioning of the modern global financial system, the euro seemed to be a 
shelter for its members (Wyplosz 2009), attitudes regarding the euro 
changed completely following a series of events that began with the Greek 
fiscal crisis in early 2010. Despite a number of attempts by various 
European institutions, the crisis continues and the outlook is bleak. Why is 
it so difficult to resolve the euro-crisis? 
The typical answers to this question are that the euro-area does not 
constitute an optimum currency area or that monetary unions were 
traditionally combined with fiscal and political unions. These generalisations 
of course have some validity, but given the status quo and the complexity 
of the euro-area’s legal and institutional arrangements, they are not very 
helpful in providing solutions or determining the fate of the euro. 
In this article we summarise ten major roots of the euro-crisis and 
assess the policy responses (if any) to these issues. This is followed by a 
more in-depth examination of the most pressing problem that also 
constitutes the most serious threat to the integrity of the euro-area: the 
dreary economic outlook of southern euro-area member states. We 
conclude that instead of exiting or breaking-up the euro, the common 
interest lies in discovering ways in which these countries can be offered 
improved prospects for the future. A great deal of homework needs to be 
accomplished in these countries, but other euro-area partners, as well as 
European institutions, will also have a decisive role to play in supporting 
the process. In the medium term, additional intuitional changes will be 
necessary to complement the currently planned overhaul of the euro-area’s 
institutional framework. 
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2. Ten major reasons behind the euro-area crisis  
and the EU’s policy responses to date 
The euro-area has deep-rooted problems. We follow Darvas (2011c) in 
categorising ten important issues – the first four relate to pre-crisis 
developments, while the other six relate to issues highlighted by the crisis. 
2.1 The failure of the Stability and Growth Pact 
First, the rules-based Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), which was the 
cornerstone of fiscal prudence in the European Union, failed. In Darvas 
(2010b), we calculated the number of violations of the euro-entry criteria, 
which also include the two fiscal criteria of the SGP: the 3% of GDP 
budget deficit criterion and the 60% of GDP government debt criterion.1 
We found that between 2001 and 2006, i.e., after the euro was introduced 
but before the global financial crisis erupted in 2007, approximately one-
third of euro-area member states had violated the SGP. Such violations 
have greatly diminished the trust in the effectiveness of European rules-
based surveillance systems and resulted in high public debt, especially in 
Greece and Italy, at the start of the crisis. 
 
A number of new agreements have been reached to strengthen the SGP. 
The new agreements include the so-called “Six-Pack” (five regulations 
and one directive approved by all 27 Member States and the European 
                                                          
1 To be more precise, the exact definitions are as follows: (a) the budget deficit 
should not be larger than three per cent of GDP, unless “either the ratio has 
declined substantially and continuously and reached a level that comes close to the 
reference value, or, alternatively, the excess over the reference value is only 
exceptional and temporary and the ratio remains close to the reference value”; (b) 
government debt should not be greater than 60% of GDP, unless “the ratio is 
sufficiently diminishing and approaching the reference value at a satisfactory 
pace”. To calculate the number of violations of these criteria in Darvas (2010b) we 
used the three per cent benchmark for the deficit and the following definition of 
meeting the general government debt criterion: a country is considered to meet the 
criterion if either the debt/GDP ratio is below 60% or, if it is above this figure, then 
projecting the average change in the debt/GDP ratio over the latest three years 20 
years ahead will lead to a ratio below 60%. Note that the “Six-Pack” reforms 
adopted in 2011 operationalised this criterion exactly the same way (just the 
wording differs): the gap between the debt level and the 60% reference should be 
reduced by at least 1/20th annually (on average over three years); see European 
Commission (2011). 
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Parliament in October 2010), 2 the “Euro Plus Pact” (signed by 23 
countries in March 2011), 3 the so-called “Fiscal Compact” (Treaty on 
Stability, Coordination and Governance in the EMU, signed by 25 
countries in March 2012). 4 Furthermore, a new proposal called the “Two-
Pack” drafted by the European Commission in November 2011 is 
currently under negotiation.5 These new agreements fundamentally reform 
fiscal coordination, surveillance and enforcement in the EU, and in 
particular, in the euro-area. Fiscal rules will be stronger, they will be 
enshrined in national constitutions and non-compliance will be sanctioned 
in a quasi-automatic way. These agreements, if implemented and properly 
employed in practice, could help to sustain healthy fiscal positions once 
the current crisis is solved. However, they are less helpful in resolving the 
current fiscal crisis in the euro-area. Although the so-called structural 
budget balance (i.e., a budget that is balanced once the impact of the 
economic cycle and one-time expenditures and revenue measures are 
removed) will receive greater emphasis, the new agreements lead to a 
strong contractionary bias, i.e., pro-cyclical fiscal policy during the current 
downturn. Moreover, the current situation could only be made worse by 
forcing Spain to pay an immediate fine. 
An alternative solution, a form of Eurobonds (i.e., pooled national debt 
issuances), is unfortunately not yet on the table. The proposal by Delpla 
and von Weizsäcker (2010) of splitting debt issuances into a senior 
component of up to 60% of a member state’s GDP (called “Blue bonds”, 
guaranteed by all participating countries) and a junior component above 
the 60% threshold (“Red bonds”, guaranteed by the issuing country alone), 
would stabilise government financing (via the Blue bonds) but at the same 
time would expose governments to market discipline (via the Red bonds). 
At the current juncture, Blue bonds should be phased in through complete 
pooling of new issuances, in which a member state can participate until its 
share of the stock of Eurobonds reaches 60% of its GDP (Darvas 2011b). 
Such a phasing in would provide struggling countries with a long period of 
time to put their fiscal houses in order, while benefiting from a low interest 
rate. Unfortunately, talks for any sort of Eurobonds are not on the table, 
partly due to the mistrust between euro-area nations, and partly due to the 
very complex institutional framework that would be required to make the 
                                                          
2 See European Commission (2011). 
3 See European Council (2011). 
4 See European Council (2012b). 
5 See European Commission (2012a) for a concise comparison of the “Six-Pack”, 
the “Fiscal Compact” and the “Two-Pack”. 
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common bond issuance function properly, in the absence of an adequate 
level of political and fiscal integration. 
2.2 Neglect of private-sector vulnerabilities 
Second, there was a sole focus on fiscal issues – and a consequent 
neglect of private-sector behaviour. This resulted in unsustainable credit 
and housing booms in countries such as Ireland and Spain (Ahearne et al. 
2008) and the emergence of structural imbalances such as high current-
account deficits and eroded competitiveness. Divergence within a 
monetary union, such as divergence in current account balances, is not 
necessarily a bad thing. Capital flows across regions and the ensuing 
current account deficits and surpluses may reflect the improved utilisation 
of resources when capital moves to fast-growing regions to the benefit of 
the entire monetary union. However, the booms and busts in the Irish and 
Spanish housing sectors (Ahearne et al. 2008) exemplify capital 
misallocation. Additionally the accumulation of “excessive” regional debt 
is undesirable, and there are good reasons to conclude that the external 
debt of Greece, Portugal and Spain became excessive (Darvas 2012b). 
Figure 5-1 depicts changes in current account balances in five main 
geographical regions of the EU since 1995 and the projections of the IMF 
until 2017. In southern European countries, the median current account 
balance exceeded ten per cent of GDP before the crisis and the pace of 
adjustment is slow, especially in comparison to the rapid adjustment in 
eastern European countries. While private capital inflows halted and even 
reversed both in southern and eastern Europe, in southern Europe banks 
received massive liquidity support from the European Central Bank 
(ECB), which has offset the sudden stop in private capital flows. Such 
support has contributed to financial stability, but at the same time, has 
made it possible for these countries to delay the adjustment, as noted by 
Sinn (2011). 
The crisis was a bitter proof that not only fiscal issues matter. The 
“Six-Pack” and “Euro Plus Pact” also include regulations to prevent and 
correct of private sector imbalances, such as weak competitiveness 
positions and high private debt. A new procedure, the so-called 
Macroeconomic Imbalance Procedure (MIP), was introduced with the aim 
of assessing these private sector vulnerabilities and assisting countries in 
designing remedies (European Commission 2012b). Undoubtedly, this 
procedure is a major innovation in the EU’s economic governance 
framework. However, their effectiveness needs to be tested, and in any 
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case adjustment within the euro-area could take a long time and hence 
quick improvements are not expected. 
 
 
Fig. 5-1 Current account balances in main geographical groups of the EU (% of 
GDP), 1995–2017 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from IMF (2012) data 
Note: median values are indicated for the groups, which have the following 
composition: 
West: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, and the Netherlands; 
South: Greece, Italy, Portugal, and Spain; 
North: Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Ireland, and the UK; 
Central: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia; 
East: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Bulgaria, and Romania. 
2.3 Lack of structural adjustment 
Third, there were no proper mechanisms to foster structural 
adjustment. Some countries, such as Germany, were able to adjust within 
the euro-area on their own (i.e., Germany’s competitiveness improved 
considerably from the mid-1990s until the onset of the current crisis; see, 
e.g., Darvas 2012a), but others, such as Greece, Italy, Spain and Portugal, 
were not. While Germany, Italy and Portugal had the worst growth 
performance among euro-area member states before the crisis, Germany 
boosted its competitiveness during this period, but not Italy and Portugal. 
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Booming domestic demand contributed to rapid economic growth in Spain 
and Greece before the crisis, which obscured the more serious structural 
problems. Following IMF (2010) and Allard and Evaraert (2010), in 
Darvas and Pisani-Ferry (2011) we studied certain aspects of growth that 
could be improved with structural reforms. We found that southern 
European countries are severely lagging behind in all criteria. 
Fostering structural adjustment is one of the aims of the MIP. The so-
called “European Semester,” a yearly cycle of mutual assessment of fiscal 
and structural issues was introduced in 2010, which encompasses all new 
instruments, including the MIP. This is also undoubtedly useful, yet the 
jury is still out on its effectiveness. By studying the first European 
Semester, Marzinotto et al. (2011) conclude that member states are only 
slowly internalising the new procedure and the Semester has thus far 
lacked legitimacy due to the minor role assigned to the European 
Parliament, the marginal involvement of national parliaments and the lack 
of transparency at some stages of the process. 
2.4 Lack of a crisis-resolution mechanism 
Fourth, there was no crisis-resolution mechanism for euro-area 
countries. The series of sovereign debt crises in the euro-area came as a 
surprise and euro-area policymakers had to improvise. It is important to 
highlight that in other federations, such as the US, there are no crisis-
resolution mechanisms for sub-central governments either (Darvas 2010a). 
When studying the conditions required for a fiscal union to function 
smoothly and successfully, Bordo et al. (2011) conclude “The first and 
probably the most important condition is a credible commitment to a no-
bailout rule.” In the euro-area at present, the reluctance on the part of the 
citizens of economically stronger countries such as Germany, the 
Netherlands and Finland, to extend loans to economically weaker 
countries, such as Greece, highlight the validity of this conclusion. 
However, it also must be recognised that public debt levels in certain euro-
area member states are much higher than sub-central government debt in 
other federations, and due to the reasons discussed in the next two 
sections, an uncontrolled default could be more harmful for the rest of the 
euro-area than a similar default of a sub-central government in other 
federations.6 
                                                          
6 This conclusion remains valid even though a properly designed debt restructuring 
inside the euro-area should not cause a major contagion, as we argued in Darvas 
(2011a), and as the subsequent Greek experience has shown. 
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The lack of a sovereign debt crisis resolution mechanism was initially 
addressed through some temporary arrangements: bilateral lending from 
euro-area partners (in partnership with the IMF) to Greece in May 2010, 
and the establishment of two financing mechanisms, the EFSF (European 
Financial Stability Facility)7 and the EFSM (European Financial Stability 
Mechanism)8. The European Stability Mechanism (ESM)9, a permanent 
rescue fund with €500 billion in resources, will likely be introduced later 
in 2012. The resources, even if augmented with IMF lending, would not be 
sufficient if Italy were to require assistance. Moreover, it would be much 
more preferable to design an institutional framework in which member 
states did not have to lend money to each other. 
2.5 Interdependence of banks and sovereigns 
Fifth, the national bank resolution regimes and the large home country 
bias in banks’ government bond holdings imply that there is a lethal 
correlation between banking and sovereign debt crises. When a 
government gets into trouble, so does the country's banking system (e.g., 
Greece), and vice versa (e.g., Ireland). Merler and Pisani-Ferry (2012a) 
demonstrated that most continental euro-area countries were characterised 
by the large size of their banks’ portfolios of domestic government bonds, 
which were markedly larger than in the UK or the US. Moreover, during 
the crisis this vulnerability has increased, as all countries for which 
concerns about state solvency arose have observed a reversal in the 
previously steady increase of the share of government debt held by non-
residents. Germany, by contrast, has seen an increase in the share held by 
non-residents. 
The lethal correlation between banking and sovereign debt crises could 
be best addressed with a so-called “banking federation” or “banking 
union”, whereby bank resolution and deposit guarantees would be 
centralised at the euro-area (or preferably the EU) level, which would also 
require the centralisation of regulation and supervision. This is because 
when bank resolution in a given country is not the responsibility of that 
country’s government, but bank recapitalisation, when needed, would be 
financed using a common fund, then banking fragility would not lead 
directly to sovereign debt problems for that government. The opposite 
case, where the fragility of the government is transmitted to the banks of a 
given country, could also be better managed when regulation and 
                                                          
7 See EFSF (2012). 
8 See EFSM (2012). 
9 See European Council (2012a). 
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supervision are centralised at the euro-area level. The notion of a banking 
union was not on the agenda until late spring 2012, despite numerous calls 
by economists (see, e.g., Véron 2011). However, the intensification of the 
euro crisis brought euro-area policymakers back to reality, and perhaps the 
call for a banking union seemed a politically more acceptable alternative 
compared to a more rapid move towards a full-fledged fiscal union. 
Consequently, the European Council on 28–29 June 2012 called for a 
banking union and the European Commission proposed its first element, a 
single supervisory mechanism for banks on 12 September 2012. It was 
agreed that once banks come under the control of the joint supervisor, the 
ESM would be able to recapitalise banks directly. The willingness of 
member states to relinquish national sovereignty over major banking 
issues is clearly an important development in crisis management. 
However, the formation of the banking union will be an extremely 
complex process, and many open issues need to be negotiated and agreed 
upon, as discussed by Pisani-Ferry et al. (2012), including the means of 
providing financing for the banking union, which is studied by Pisani-
Ferry and Wolff (2012). 
2.6 Interdependence between countries 
Sixth, there is a strong interdependence between countries – much 
stronger than was generally perceived during the good years before the 
crisis. The collapse of a small country can create a contagion and the 
collapse of a large country would lead to a meltdown. Italy, for example, 
cannot be allowed to go bankrupt, as it would bankrupt the Italian banking 
system, which in turn would cause a meltdown throughout the rest of the 
euro-area banking system through high-level linkages and would also have 
disruptive effects outside the euro-area. This channel remains important 
even if financial integration were reversed to a significant extent, as 
argued by the ECB (2012a). 
The strong interdependence between countries should primarily be 
addressed via limiting the scope of the fiscal and private sector 
vulnerabilities of member states. Once the crisis is over, the European 
Semester and all the instruments included in it could help in this regard – 
to the extent of course that the Semester will prove to be effective. A 
properly designed banking union as discussed above is the best means of 
addressing banking interdependence. Furthermore, a type of Eurobonds, 
such as the Blue bond discussed before, would help to limit the spread of a 
sovereign debt crisis from one country to another. 
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2.7 Lack of a lender of last resort for sovereigns 
Seventh, the strict prohibition on the European Central Bank/Eurosystem 
providing monetary financing means that euro-area governments borrow 
as if they were borrowing in a “foreign” currency, as highlighted by De 
Grauwe (2011). This is because a central bank can in principle act as a 
lender of last resort for the sovereign, i.e., print money and buy 
government bonds (as the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England and the 
Bank of Japan did during the crisis). The lack of a lender of last resort for 
sovereigns of individual states of a monetary union is not a substantial 
problem when the level of debt is low. For example, in the US, the Federal 
Reserve does not buy the debt of states such as California or New York but 
only buys federal bonds. Although California has been in deep financial 
trouble since 2007, its eventual default would not cause a major disruption 
to the US banking system. The reasons are that the debt of the State of 
California is small, approximately 7% of California’s GDP (the debt of 
local governments in California represents an additional 13% of the state’s 
GDP); moreover, this debt is not held by banks, but mainly by individuals. 
However the default of Italy would be a game changer in Europe.  
The lack of a lender of last resort for sovereigns could be remedied by 
establishing a stronger political and fiscal union that could provide the 
basis for changing the statutes of the ECB. Absent such a change, the ECB 
can act within its current mandate. The ECB has already purchased the 
sovereign bonds of member states under the so-called Securities Market 
Programme (SMP) beginning in May 2010, which was terminated on 
6 September 2012, and a new programme called Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) was introduced (ECB 2010, 2012b). 
The SMP only had temporary effects on government bond yields for a 
number of reasons. First, the ECB itself communicated that these 
operations will remain limited, and even introduced a weekly cap. Second, 
the ECB claimed senior creditor status with respect to other bondholders, 
and therefore ECB purchases increased the eventual losses of other 
bondholders in the case of a default. Third, the modalities of the SMP were 
unclear: the ECB started and ended bond purchases without known 
guidelines. Fourth, in the case of Greece the SMP attempted to temper the 
government bond market in a country with a fundamentally unsustainable 
fiscal situation (Darvas et al. 2011). Finally, the SMP was subject to moral 
hazard, exemplified by the Italian government’s backtracking on promised 
reforms in the summer of 2011, after the ECB began purchasing Italian 
bonds.  
The new OMT differs from the SMP in major respects. First, it will be 
based on strong conditionality (i.e., compliance with a full or a precautionary 
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macroeconomic adjustment programme by the EFSF or the ESM). ECB 
intervention will not be automatic, but the Governing Council will decide 
on a case-by-case basis when and to what extent it will intervene. Second, 
it will be unlimited in principle. Third, the ECB will be treated pari passu 
with other creditors, i.e. the ECB will not have any preferential treatment 
in the case of a credit event. Furthermore, transparency of OMT holdings 
will also be higher (the breakdown by country and the average duration of 
holdings will be published). Moreover, there is clarity on the maturity of 
eligible bonds, i.e. between one and three years, which is the relevant 
horizon for monetary transmission. These characteristics likely constitute 
the outer limit of what is feasible within the ECB’s mandate. 
The initial reactions in the markets (until the completion of the 
manuscript for this article in mid-September 2012) were positive. For 
example, the 2-year Spanish government bond yield fell from a 15-year 
record high of 6.9% in late July 2012 to below 3% in early September 
2012. Longer maturity yields have also fallen somewhat.  
It was wise for the ECB to introduce the OMT, as otherwise the euro 
crisis may have escalated in mid-2012. By preventing a self-fulfilling 
crisis, the OMT may help to reduce government bond yields, and thereby 
also lower private sector yields, which will help the economy. However, 
the OMT operations can only buy precious time, but cannot solve the euro 
crisis and cannot fully eliminate the risk of an eventual euro-area exit, as 
these are dependent on the answers given to the other more fundamental 
problems of the euro-area we discuss.10 
2.8 Downward spiral and negative feedback 
between the crisis and growth 
Eighth, there is a downward spiral in adjusting countries: i.e., fiscal 
adjustment leading to a weaker economy, thereby reducing public 
revenues and creating additional fiscal adjustment needs. It is extremely 
difficult to break this vicious circle in the absence of a stand-alone 
currency. In the US, automatic stabilisers, such as unemployment 
insurance, are operated by the federal government, which also invests 
more in distressed states – but in Europe such instruments do not exist. An 
economic stabilisation tool is badly needed for the euro-area, which should 
work as automatically as possible and be financed from a euro-area wide 
tax. It should be confined to economic stabilisation only, but not making a 
platform for permanent transfers between euro-area member states. 
                                                          
10 See Darvas (2012c) for an assessment of the various criticisms of the OMT. 
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The negative feedback loop between the crisis and growth does not 
only exist in southern European adjusting countries, but in all euro-area 
countries. Uncertainty over the future of the euro, and the risk of economic 
hardship that an eventual break-up would bring, makes corporations and 
households more hesitant to invest and consume. Corporations in the 
economically stronger countries are also directly affected by the 
deteriorating situation in economically weaker countries through trade and 
financial links.  
Furthermore, the funding constraints in the banking sector, the increasing 
credit risks for banks due to the weakening economic outlook, and the 
efforts to raise banks’ capital ratios lead to a reduction in credit supply. 
Reduced credit availability further dampens economic growth. Without 
effective solutions to address the crisis, growth is unlikely to resume. 
The EU did not have a powerful response to the growth crisis. The 
main goals of the "Compact for Growth and Jobs" agreed to at the 29 June 
2012 summit (European Council 2012c), such as structural reforms, 
completing the restructuring of the banking sector, growth-friendly fiscal 
consolidations, addressing the social consequences of the crisis, and 
deepening the single market, are all correct. However, few new tools were 
mobilised to achieve these goals. Providing fresh capital to the European 
Investment Bank (EIB) in the amount of €10 billion (which would 
increase lending capacity by €60 billion) and launching a pilot phase for 
Project Bonds up to €4.5 billion are welcome, but these would have a 
limited impact on growth in the EU. Moreover, while mobilising idle 
structural funds, which was also agreed on at the summit, is also crucial, 
this does not constitute new funding. 
2.9 Lack of a euro-area fiscal policy 
Ninth, no institution is responsible for managing the overall fiscal 
stance of the euro-area. Member states implement the policy deemed 
appropriate for their own economies, subject to the constraints of the 
European fiscal governance framework. However, on aggregate, such 
decentralised fiscal policy is unlikely to produce optimal fiscal policy for 
the euro-area as a whole. For example, while the aggregate fiscal position 
of the euro-area is much better than that of the US (Figure 5-2), and while 
the economic outlook is arguably more fragile in the euro-area, there is a 
much stronger consolidation bias in the euro-area as a whole than in the 
US. Certainly, states in the US are also independent in setting state-level 
fiscal policies (all but one has a balanced-budget constitutional rule), and 
the second major conclusion of Bordo et al. (2011) concerning the conditions 
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necessary for a fiscal union to function smoothly and successfully is “a 
degree of revenue and expenditure independence of the members of the 
fiscal union reflecting their preferences.” However in the US the federal 
government dispenses approximately half of the total tax revenues and 
considers the US economy as a whole when setting fiscal policy targets 
(Darvas 2010a). In other federations, such as Canada or Switzerland, the 
circumstances are similar. 
Unfortunately, the euro-area has not yet reached a point where a 
discussion can be begun on the overall fiscal stance of the euro-area and 





Fig. 5-2 The aggregate fiscal positions of the euro-area and the USA (% of GDP), 
1990–2017 
Sources: Euro-area balance and debt – IMF (2012); US balance – AMECO 
database up to 2000 and IMF (2012) for 2001–2017;  
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US debt: USGovernmentSpending.com (2012) up to 2012, for 2013–2017 we 
assumed that state and local government debt will remain at the 2012 value as a 
per cent of GDP and federal debt increases as projected by IMF (2012). 
Note: US general government debt also includes the debt of states and local 
governments (IMF and European Commission data only report federal debt, even 
though they call it, erroneously, “general government gross debt”). 
2.10  Executive and democratic deficit 
Tenth, the current crisis is not just a sovereign debt, banking and 
growth crisis, but is also a governance crisis. In most cases the response of 
European policymakers has been partial, inadequate and belated, and they 
have thereby lost trust in their ability to resolve the crisis. Some observers 
have concluded that agreeing on a comprehensive solution is technically 
and politically beyond reach. Compounded with the lack of democratic 
accountability of various European decision making bodies, Véron (2012) 
places the “executive and democratic deficit” at the centre of the lingering 
euro crisis and argues that some of the most important problems, such as 
Europe’s banking crisis, the Greek sovereign debt saga, or the weak 
growth outlook of southern European member states, could have been 
addressed earlier and in a decisive way, had proper European decision 
making processes existed. 
Regarding the political constraints, overcoming executive and democratic 
deficiencies is a truly fundamental issue. Nigel Lawson is most likely right 
when he claimed: “There is no wish among the people of Europe … for a 
full blooded United States of Europe political union”.11 Therefore, any 
progress towards a more effective and legitimate decision making and 
executive system will be, at best, piecemeal. 
3. Southern Europe and the euro’s future 
The combined impact of all the factors discussed thus far drives down 
the economic outlook in the euro-area, and in particular, in Southern 
Europe. Figure 5-3 takes a historical perspective on changes in GDP per 
capita in the main geographical areas of the EU. After World War II, 
European countries embarked on a rapid convergence with the US in terms 
                                                          
11 Nigel Lawson was the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the government of 
Margaret Thatcher during 1983–1989. He also claimed that “The whole thing [i.e. 
the euro] is a nonsense, and the sooner the whole thing can be dismantled in an 
orderly way, the better”, with which I disagree. Source of the quotes: Mullholland 
(2011). 
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of GDP per capita, which was in part based on the rebuilding of the capital 
stock lost during the war, in part on technological catching-up and in part 
on economic integration efforts (Darvas and Pisani-Ferry 2011). By the 
late 1970s, however, convergence with the US had stopped in most 
countries of the “older” Europe – although with significant exceptions, 
such as Ireland. However, in the years ahead, according to the world 
economic outlook of the IMF, European countries are expected to fall 
behind, especially in southern Europe. Moreover, the IMF outlook must be 




Fig. 5-3 GDP per capita in major geographical regions of the EU (USA = 100), 
1950–2017 
Source: Author’s calculations using data from IMF (2012), PENN World Tables 
and EBRD 
Note: GDP is based on purchasing power parity dollars; median values are shown 
for the country groups defined in the note to Figure 5-2. 
 
The single most important threat to the integrity, and perhaps also the 
existence, of the euro is the bleak economic outlook for southern European 
member states. Without the problems of economically weaker countries in 
Southern Europe (for which western and northern members also bear 
responsibility), western and northern members would be able to overcome 
their baking woes, and the other issues we identified as the roots of the 
euro crisis would be much less relevant. 
Economic growth in Southern Europe would gradually help to improve 
the unemployment situation and ease social tensions. It would help to 
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improve public finances, thereby lessening the need for fiscal consolidation. 
It would help to stabilise asset prices, and in particular, housing prices, 
which in turn would improve the balance sheets of banks, thereby also 
reducing recapitalisation needs. Increased trust in banks and the hope of an 
economic recovery would slow or even reverse capital outflows from these 
counties. As a consequence, economic growth in Southern Europe would 
greatly diminish the exit risk facing some southern euro members. 
But growth is not coming, and in fact the recession deepens. Several 
commentators concluded that southern euro members have no hope for 
growth inside the euro-area and an exit from the euro is the only viable 
option. While undoubtedly it would be much easier for southern euro 
members to solve their problems outside the euro-area, I disagree on both 
counts: there is some hope, at least in some southern members on the one 
hand, and on the other hand an exit would likely be so disastrous that it 
would take a very long time to recoup the output that would be lost during 
the exit process. An exit would cause devastating consequences for 
economically stronger countries as well, thereby creating existential risk 
for the euro, with severe implications for the EU as well. 
 
• Hope: Since 2008, Spanish exports are performing the best among 
the EU-15 countries, i.e., the pre-2004 members of the EU (Darvas 
2012a). Spain is followed by Germany, Ireland and Portugal. Spain 
and Portugal even outperform the UK and Sweden, two countries 
that benefitted from significant currency depreciation during the 
crisis.12 While their tradable sectors remain small, solid export 
performance is an indication the tradable sector is able to expand. 
Additionally, the World Bank (2012) found that large and 
internationalised firms in Southern Europe are as productive as 
large firms in Western and Northern Europe, and the main issue is 
that there are far fewer large firms in Southern Europe, due to 
various barriers. Altomonte et al. (2012) arrived at a similar 
conclusion. This suggests that while the business conditions are 
unfavourable and there are barriers to firm growth, properly 
managed firms are able to achieve a high level of efficiency even in 
Southern Europe. 
• Disastrous exit: It is impossible to provide an accurate estimate of 
the cost of an exit from the euro, but it would most likely be huge. 
UBS (2011) have concluded that an economically weak country 
leaving the euro-area would lose approximately one half of its GDP 
                                                          
12 However, the export performance of Greece is very weak. 
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in the first year. If they are correct, it is unclear how many years it 
would take to compensate for the lost output, even if growth were 
to increase from this halved level of output. The huge decline in 
output would necessitate even harsher fiscal austerity, as it is not 
very likely that in the event of a messy exit from the euro other 
euro-area partners would be happy to lend to the country that left 
the euro – without such support, the government could spend only 
tax revenues, which would be dramatically reduced by the collapse 
of GDP. Moreover, there would also be longer term consequences, 
as the low credibility of the newly stand-alone central bank of the 
exiting country would likely lead to much higher real interest rates 
and a period of high inflation, which are bad for growth. 
Additionally, a euro exit may be accompanied by an EU exit and 
thereby the country would lose huge transfers form the EU. It is 
also in the best interest of euro-area partners to keep these countries 
in the union, and not just because of the direct losses that would 
arise from financial and trade relations with the exiting country. 
Even more importantly, the exit of a country would open Pandora's 
box: it would be very difficult to safeguard other economically 
weaker countries and a wave of exits would be even more 
disastrous for the economically stronger euro-area countries.13 
 
However, the good news we highlighted and the fears of disaster do 
not guarantee that the deep economic slump in these countries will end 
anytime soon. If the recession continues to deepen, social tensions could 
escalate, which may lead to domestic political paralysis. Under such 
circumstances, cooperation between euro-area partners and the country in 
question, including financial assistance that has already been granted to 
some southern euro members, would halt, leading to an accelerated and 
possibly uncontrolled exit from the euro-area, with all the consequences 
we described above. 
Therefore, ending the recession and offering improved economic 
prospects for southern euro members is pivotal, and actions will be 
required at both the national and European levels – well beyond the 
Compact for growth and jobs: 
 
• The southern euro-countries should engage in a number of efforts: 
we have highlighted that they suffer from huge structural 
weaknesses, which are impediments to growth. Moreover, while 
                                                          
13 And the euro is not just about economics but has major historical and political 
roots as well. 
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productivity has improved and unit labour costs have fallen, e.g., in 
Spain since 2008, this was mainly the consequence of reduced 
employment, which has adverse social consequences. Wages 
proved to be downwardly rigid (Darvas 2012a). Structural reforms 
to improve the functioning of labour markets are also inevitable, 
yet it will take a long time for these reforms to take effect. 
• There is a strong case for calling for unit labour cost (ULC) 
increases in “western” and “northern” euro-area trading partners 
(see for example Wolff (2012) and Merler and Pisani-Ferry 
(2012b)). To some extent wages have begun to increase in 
Germany, but in any case this process will take a long time. 
Moreover, higher average inflation in the euro-area may also help 
to correct pre-crisis intra-euro divergences in prices and wages, but 
such a policy would be clearly unacceptable to the economically 
stronger countries of the euro-area. 
• Fiscal expansion in northern members of the euro-area, or at least a 
significant slowdown in the pace of fiscal consolidation, would 
facilitate the economic adjustment of the southern members (Merler 
and Pisani-Ferry 2012b), but unfortunately, the relaxation of fiscal 
targets in Northern Europe does not seem to be on the agenda. 
• A weaker euro would also greatly facilitate the adjustment of 
southern euro-area members (Darvas 2012b), which would be 
fostered by further interest rate cuts and quantitative easing by the 
European Central Bank. A weaker euro would help southern 
economies to improve their trade balances with non-euro countries 
and would also boost German exports. This in turn would help to 
address intra-euro imbalances, since increased exports would likely 
translate into greater wage increases in Germany, due to the 
country’s tight labour market, but not in Spain, due to its high 
unemployment. Thus, Spain’s competitiveness vis-à-vis Germany 
would also improve. Without a weaker euro, Spain would need to 
enter a deflationary period, which on the one hand is difficult to 
achieve and on the other would make debt sustainability even more 
difficult. 
• Euro-area partners should also recognise that public debt at least in 
Greece is still too high. Even if the austerity programme is 
implemented as planned, it is very unlikely that Greece will be able 
to repay all of its public debt. Prolonging the recognition of this 
issue simply prolongs the uncertainty about Greece’s future, 
thereby also negatively impacting the economy. However, as 
European partners have lent money to Greece to repay private 
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lenders and therefore ‘socialised’ Greek public debt, further 
significant public debt reduction cannot be accomplished without 
some involvement by the official sector. This is the price that euro-
area partners have to pay for their mistakes in managing the Greek 
crisis in 2010 and 2011. 
• Finally, to help break the downward economic spiral that southern 
euro-area member states face, a very significant European 
investments programme is needed for southern members. Note that 
investments are different from aid and lending. 
4. Concluding remarks 
The euro suffers from a large number of flaws, which were cast in stark 
relief during the crisis. For some of these flaws, solutions were provided, 
even if belatedly, and member states exhibited a willingness to improve 
the functioning of the euro by agreeing to relinquish national sovereignty 
in some important dimensions. However, the single most pressing issue, 
which threatens the integrity and perhaps the existence of the euro, is not 
yet well addressed: the deepening economic recession in southern member 
states. Most of the major policy measures that would help to stop the 
economic misery of these countries and offer the prospect for improved 
economic conditions are not yet on the agenda. Only time will tell the 
economic and political denouement of southern euro member and what 
progress will be made in addressing the ten main roots of the euro crisis 
that we have identified. 
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